High unemployment in Europe has led many economists and policy-makers to praise rapid job creation and low unemployment in the US and to credit its relatively unregulated labour markets for this success. We question the implication that Europe should adopt US-style labour market deregulation and flexibility. A detailed examination of the US and E-4 (French, German, Italian, and UK) data reveals almost no difference in unemployment rates for 'prime-age' males but large ones for other demographic groups both widiin and among all countries (and not just between the US and the E-4). We also assess die impact of various employment regulations, wage-setting institutions, and income security policies on E-4 unemployment. We conclude that the evidence is mixed, and, more importandy, diat the same institutions which may raise unemployment in Europe are also contributing to its more rapid earnings growth and greater earnings equality relative to the US. Thus, European labour market deregulation would at best be a very mixed blessing.
Introduction
A spectre is haunting Europe-the spectre of unemployment. The drastic deterioration in European employment performance over the past three-and-a-half decades is amply demonstrated by the average unemployment rate of the four largest European economies (the E-4): France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. Unemployment in these countries has quadrupled since the early 1960s and doubled over the past two decades. What makes this development even more haunting is the fact that no reversal of the trend is in sight.
Labour economists and politicians concerned about high unemployment in Europe often look to the achievements of comparatively unregulated US labour markets: rapid job creation and relatively low unemployment. This paper calls into question the implication that US-style labour market flexibility is the answer for Europe. The paper is divided into two parts: first, we examine the employment/unemployment performance of the E-4 and the US, considering various alternative measures of joblessness. Second, we evaluate the role of widely varying labour market institutions and regulations in shaping equally widely varying labour market outcomes among these countries. Table 1 presents average unemployment rates for die E-4 and the US for selected periods from the early 1960s to the present. A comparison of alternative OECD measures shows rates based on 'commonly used definitions' in Part (a) that are somewhat lower for Italy and die UK than die 'standardised' rates in Part (b) and almost identical for France and the US. 2 The biggest difference between Part (a) and Part (b)-the unemployment rates for Germany in die last period-is due to die differential treatment of eastern Germany after unification. These alternative unemployment estimates suggest diat if unification had not occurred, diere might have been little change in Germany's average unemployment between 1980-87 and 1988-96 . 3 The US Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes international labour force statistics, applying US concepts. Except for Italy, average unemployment rates based on diis concept are similar to the OECD standardised rates. Therefore, only Italy's unemployment rate, according to US definitions, is reported in Part (c) of Table I . 4 The performance of die E-4 is summarised (for comparison to die US) in die last rows of Parts (a) and (b) of Table 1 . By eidier definition, E-4 unemployment was about two percentage points below die US in die 1960s and 1970s and about diree percentage points above die US in die late 1980s to mid-1990s period. This reversal in die relative unemployment performance of die US vs. die E-4, along widi much higher long-term unemployment in Europe, is widely cited as evidence of die relative success of die United States' 'unregulated' labour markets compared to Europe's 'overregulated' labour markets. Table 2 breaks down die overall unemployment rates by age and gender for die periods 1980-87 and 1988-95 . What stands out here is die great variation across age-gender groups within countries and across countries widiin age-gender groups. Thus, we identify 1 They also vary strongly between regions (particularly in the case of Italy and the UK), but we do not deal with that variation in this paper. 2 The term 'commonly used definitions' means that these are 'the most commonly cited' and 'frequently published' unemployment statistics (OECD, Economic Outlook, no. 57, 1995, p. A77) , not that they are based on a common (or uniform) definition of unemployment. The OECD standardised rates are designed to improve comparability across countries (see OECD, 1985; OECD, Employment Outlook, 1987, ch. 5) .
'Part (a) shows a 1-4 percentage point increase in unemployment in Germany between 1980-87 and 1988-96. Part (b) , which excludes eastern Germany, shows no change between the two periods. Neither table represents Germany's employment performance in die 1990s entirely fairly relative to the earlier periods. On the one hand, the rise in unemployment shown in Part (a) is largely a consequence of competitive Bhocks in the former East German economy after unification. On the other hand, the unchanged unemployment shown in Part (b) does mask a rise in unemployment that would have occurred in the absence of the initial stimulus that unification provided to the former West German economy. 4 Until 1993, Italy included the 'inactive unemployed' in its unemployment count. The BLS excludes anyone who has not actively looked for work during the past 30 days, so the adjustment to the US concept significantly reduces tie Italian rates. See Sorrentino (1993 Sorrentino ( ,1995 . specific 'pockets' of high or low unemployment in particular countries: except in Germany, youth unemployment is much higher than adult unemployment. In France and Italy, female unemployment is much higher than male unemployment. Prime-age male unemployment is relatively low everywhere, being significantly above 6% only in France (last period) and the UK. We conclude from this quick look at the data that it is incorrect to generalise about 'Europe's unemployment problem' relative to the US. Rather, high unemployment is a problem confronting particular demographic groups in specific countries. Ranking these five countries by their unemployment rates for each of the 12 age-gender categories in Table 2 , the US ranks lowest in four (three of those concern women), while Germany has the lowest youth unemployment, and Italy does best for older workers. Given the conceptual ambiguities about who is unemployed and differences among countries in how those ambiguities are resolved (e.g., the treatment of discouraged and part-time workers), it may be useful to compare countries' non-employment rates. Nonemployment includes everyone without a job, thereby avoiding the distinction between unemployment and inactivity (or being out of the labour force).
1 For the countries in our sample there is only one demographic group for which there is no socially or culturally legitimate reason to be non-employed: prime-age males. Youdis may be in school, older workers may be retired, women may be at home with children (with husbands who earn enough to support their family widi one job). Only for prime-age males can we claim that a lower non-employment rate is unambiguously better than a higher one.
Average non-employment rates for prime-age and older males are reported for the periods 1980-87 and 1988-95 in Table 3 . In the 1980-87 period, the US had the second highest prime-age male non-employment rate among our five countries. But while its non-employment rate remained almost constant (and the UK's fell slightly) between 1980-87 and 1988-95, France, Italy, and Germany's all rose substantially. However, even in the later period, both France and Italy still had lower^ prime-age male nonemployment rates than the US, and so did western Germany (figure not reported).
Non-employment among 55-64-year-old men in the 1988-95 period varies from below 40% in the US and Italy to almost 60% in France. These differences largely reflect differences among countries in opportunities for older job losers to choose early 1974-94, 1996. retirement. In France, for instance, early retirement 'bridging pensions' appeared in the 1970s, and the normal age of entitlement to a public pension was reduced from 65 to 60 in 1983 (OECD, Employment Outlook, 1992, p. 208) . In Germany, in the mid-1980s, the duration of unemployment benefits was gradually increased to as much as 32 months for those aged 54 and above, and the obligation of those aged 58 and over to register themselves as active job-seekers in order to receive benefits was removed. Those aged 57 1/2 or older at the time of job loss retain the right to an unemployment allowance until they reach 65, when they become eligible for a public pension (OECD, Employment Outlook, 1992, p. 212) . In Italy, the normal retirement age is 60, and (since 1982) workers who lose jobs due to economic crisis or industrial reorganisation can retire at aged 55 and 50, respectively, at as much as 72% of previous pay (Blondal and Pearson, Tables 5 and 6) . Further evidence that high non-employment rates for this age group do not necessarily imply greater hardship is found in the proportion of out-of-the-labour-force 55-64-yearold males who have formally retired: roughly 80% for France and 90% for Germany vs. 50% for the US and only 30% for the UK (OECD, Employment Outlook, 1988, p. 67) . Clearly, older men's non-employment rates are influenced by the availability of retirement benefits. They probably also depend on the availability of jobs. The welfare implications of the non-employment rate for this age group is therefore ambiguous-we cannot assume, as we do for prime-age males, that a lower non-employment rate is better than a higher one. Table 4 adjusts the prime-age male non-employment rates (averages over 1992-93) by the rate of incarceration of 25-54-year-old males.
1 Because incarceration rates are almost six times higher in the US than they are in Europe, the very small European advantage in prime-age male non-employment widens into a significant difference when the prison population is included in the non-employment rate. In summary, the large 1988-95 prime-age male unemployment gap in favour of the US (51% vs. 6-6% in Table 2a , or almost 30%), shrinks to an insignificant mm-employment gap (11 -9% vs. 12-2% in Table  3 , or 3%) and reverses itself for 1992/93 in favour of the European countries (14-6% vs. 130% in Table 4 , column 3, or 12%), when the non-employment rates are adjusted to include the incarcerated population.
1 Our adjustment assumes that aggregate employment would not increase if fewer people were incarcerated. The idea of adjusting unemployment data by the incarceration rate is suggested by . An extensive search for international data on incarceration rates turned up a single source which provided rates only for the period 1992-93: Mauer (1995). (1) Non-employment rates are calculated as described in Table 3 .
(2) Incarceration rates are estimates of the number of 25-54-year-old males who are incarcerated expressed as a percentage of their number in the population.
(3) The adjusted rate adds the incarcerated population to both the numerator and denominator of the non-employment rate.
Sources for incarceration rates: Mauer, 1995, Men (2) 11-2 7-3 8.8 14-3 11-7 10-4 Note: For women and for men (column 1) the BLS U-7 type unemployment rate is the official rate augmented by discouraged workers and half the involuntarily pan-time employed. In column (2), the U-7 unemployment rate for men is further adjusted by the number of incarcerated 16-64-year-old males, expressed as a percentage of die labour force (reported in Finally, we consider two widely cited alternative measures of unemployment: the BLS 'U-7' type unemployment rate (based on the US Bureau of Labor Statistics adjustment that includes discouraged workers and involuntarily part-time employed workers) and the long-term (one year or more) unemployment rate. The 1993 U-7 rates are reported in Table 5 , where, for men, they are augmented by male incarceration rates.
1 By the U-7 measure, female unemployment is nearly 50% higher in the E-4 than it is in the US (15-2% vs. 10-4%), but male unemployment is the same (10-1%) and adjusted male unemployment is 11% lower (10-4% vs. 11-7%).
Male long-term unemployment rates, adjusted for discouraged labour force dropouts (4) The adjusted long-term unemployment rate is the sum of the long-term unemployed, discouraged workers and the incarcerated, divided by the sum of the labour force, discouraged workers and the incarcerated.
* In Germany the unemployment rate is estimated from the registered unemployed, and individuals need not be actively seeking work to be registered. ** The DWR for Italy is for 1991. and the incarcerated, are reported in Table 6 . The first column of Table 6 shows that the E-4 have much higher long-term rates than the US (nearly four times higher on average). After adjusting these rates for labour force dropout and incarceration rates (columns 2 and 3), this gap narrows to one percentage point (4-5% vs. 3-5%). Thus, two-thirds of the highly publicised difference between US and European male long-term unemployment rates is eliminated if we include discouraged and incarcerated males with the long-term unemployed. 
The role of labour market institutions and regulations
In this section, we address the argument that European labour market institutions and regulations are the cause of rising European joblessness. We consider the impact of three different kinds of labour market institutions: (1) employment protection laws; (2) wagesetting institutions; and (3) unemployment insurance and other income support programmes. We find that the evidence is mixed, and, more importantly, that the same institutions which may contribute to the E-4's unemployment problems (vis a vis the US) also appear to contribute to the relative success of the E-4 in earnings growth and greater earnings equality.
Employment protection
It is often argued that employment protection laws are a major cause of high European unemployment. In theory, the net effect of protective legislation and norms is ambiguous. Generally, one would expect employment protection to reduce lay-offs and discharges and therefore the flow into (and level of) unemployment. At the same time, however, 1 We acknowledge that this could involve an 'overadjustment' of the data. Some discouraged workers and some prison inmates may have been employed within the last year. employment protection may reduce hiring by employers who fear being unable to reduce their workforce in the future. The net effect of employment protection on unemployment then becomes an empirical question.
There is a clear consensus among economists that, at least through the mid-1980s, Italy had the most highly regulated labour market in Europe in terms of legal restrictions on firing. Some observers argued that dismissals, whether individual or collective, were 'practically impossible'. In the former case, only criminal acts seemed to justify termination of employment; in the latter case, unions were able to delay any lay-off by 25-40 days and in most cases, they would 'occupy a plant until an agreement [was] negotiated' (Emerson, 1988, pp. 808, 810) . Nevertheless, according to two employer surveys conducted in 1985 and 1989, the perceived impact of regulatory restraints on hiring and firing decreased in the last half of die 1980s (Mosley, 1994, p. 68) . However, Italy further strengthened employment protection in 1990 by extending unfair dismissal regulations dating from the 1960s to previously exempt small firms (Mosley, 1994, p. 66) .
German law requires two to three mondis' notice for individual and collective dismissals, and they have to be approved by the relevant works council. Collective dismissals require an additional one-month notification of the Labour Office, which may be extended another month. The Employment Promotion Act of 1985 lowered some barriers to lay-offe and made it easier for employers to hire workers on fixed-term contracts (Abraham and Houseman, 1994, p. 64; Mosley, 1994, p. 66) . Employers, however, did not register any change in their perception of the stringency of restrictions in the last half of the 1980s (Mosley, 1994, p. 68) .
In France, dismissed workers are entitled to retraining at public training facilities. For collective dismissals, employers originally had to consult works councils and request the authorisation of the Labour Office. This latter rule was abolished after die change in government in 1986 (Emerson, 1988) . After another change in government in 1989, however, employment protection was increased again, and the role of public audiorities strengthened. In 1993, official approval of obligatory social plans was introduced for collective redundancies (Mosley, 1994, p. 66) . Legislation with respect to temporary work contracts varied in much die same manner as dismissal rules.
The UK is the E-4 country with the most consistent trend towards deregulation since 1979. In the area of employment protection, this has primarily taken the form of an extension of die qualifying period for unfair dismissal coverage from 26 to 105 weeks of continuous employment. Rules about collective redundancies were not affected. Temporary contracts have never been regulated in the UK (Mosley, 1994, p. 67) . The previously cited employer survey showed UK employers as least likely among a sample of 12 European countries to perceive significant constraints on dieir freedom to hire and fire workers. As Mosley (1994, p. 70) notes, however, despite the UK's laxity, die risk of involuntary termination (from eidier dismissals or termination of fixed-term contracts) is relatively low.
The basic legal status of employees in the US is described by die doctrine of 'employment-at-wilT, in which employees can be dismissed without notice or compensation for any reason (Edwards, 1993) . This doctrine has been challenged in state courts, and some states have passed laws requiring 'just cause' for dismissals. In 1988, a law requiring 60 days advance notice for plant closings and mass lay-offe was enacted, but compliance has not been effectively enforced.
The OECDJobs Study (OECD, 1994) presents the results of a number of studies that attempt to quantify the 'strictness' of employment protection in 21 OECD countries (among them Grubb and Wells, 1993; OECD Employment Outlook, 1993; Bertola, 1990; Emerson, 1988) . These studies evaluate procedural inconveniences and delays, months of advance notice and severance pay mandated by law, and difficulties in justifying individual dismissals of workers on regular contracts. They also assess protections for workers on fixed-term contracts and report surveyed employers' opinions on the seriousness of obstacles to dismissing employees on both regular and fixed-term contracts. The OECD Jobs Study develops country rankings based on these various criteria and combines them, along with Bertola's (1990) widely cited ranking, into a single consensus ranking of countries on strictness of employment protection legislation. Although the process is qualitative and somewhat subjective, it provides an unambiguous ranking of the five countries of our study. At the one extreme is the US which imposes almost no constraints on individual dismissals, except that they should not be based on sex, race, or age. Among the European countries, the UK imposes the least constraints on employers' ability to adjust the size of their work force. At the other extreme, all observers seem to agree, is Italy, with relatively strict protective laws and practices.
1 France and Germany fall between the UK and Italy and quite near each other, whether the focus is on severance and notification rules or on employers' perception of the bureaucratic burdens connected with dismissals.
What is much more ambiguous is the net impact of employment protection on overall unemployment. Lazear (1990) found that higher severance pay raises non-employment and unemployment rates. However, Addison and Grosso (1996) , after correcting errors in his data, find the negative effects of severance pay to be negligible and the effects of advance notice 'to be associated with broadly favorable outcomes' (p. 585).
The OECD Jobs Study (Table 6 .9) does show that various employment/population ratios are negatively correlated (and self-employment positively correlated) with employment protection indices, but it concedes that a deregulation strategy presents 'both opportunities for stimulating job creation and risks of increasing employment instability if fixed-term contracts grow to a considerable proportion' (p. 80). Similarly, Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) conclude that 'on balance, employment protection laws are probably bad for employment since they strengthen insider power and encourage the payment of efficiency wages to motivate workers who cannot be threatened with dismissal. But...the evidence on adverse employment effects is not strong enough to warrant a total abandonment of the practice' (p. 108).
Other observers express even more serious doubts about the link between employment protection and unemployment. Just as Flanagan (1987, p. 211 ) calls the effect of restrictions on employment 'ambiguous and probably small', Bentolila and Bertola (1990, pp. 381-82) find that 'firing costs do not have large effects on hiring decisions, nor do high firing costs reduce the average level of employment'.
For the five countries in our study, we note mixed evidence of a link between employment protection and unemployment. While it is true that Italy, the country with the strictest rules of protection, has-by several measures-the highest unemployment, it is also the case that unemployment in the UK-and particularly long-term unemployment-is relatively high, despite the fact that employment protection in the UK is weak in comparison with die other European countries.
There is another reason for scepticism about employment protection being a primary Note: Gross job gains are the sum of employment gains in all establishments reporting a net increase in employment, and gross job losses are the sum of employment declines in all establishments reporting a net decrease in employment. Job gains and losses which do not result in net employment changes for the establishment are therefore not counted. This implies that true gross job gains and losses are even higher than reported in the cause of unemployment. Economists' basic criticism of restrictions on firing is that they reduce employment flexibility-the ability to adjust employment to current levels of demand. The direct, observable impact on labour market behaviour should therefore be to reduce worker flows into and out of jobs and gross rates of job creation and destruction. There are limited data on this question, but what is available clearly refutes the stereotype of'sclerotic' European labour markets. Thus, Table 7 shows no systematic pattern among these countries in job turnover, with rates around 25% per year for France, Italy, and the US and around 15% per year for the UK and Germany. Likewise, Table 8 shows that in 1987 hiring and separation rates were similar in France, Germany, and the US. Based on its analysis of worker flows between employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation, the CEPR monograph Unemployment: Choices for Europe (1995) states that in Europe more 'worker turnover is in the form of direct job-to-job movements, whereas in the US most worker turnover is via unemployment or non-participation' (p. 11). We conclude, along with the authors of this monograph, that 'there is no obvious transatlantic difference in hiring, separation and worker turnover rates' (p. 11). Finally, we note that restricted employment-level flexibility, where it does exist, may be offset by enhanced 'internal flexibility'-the ability of employers to reassign broadly trained, functionally flexible workers to a relatively wide variety of jobs in response to changes in product markets or technology (Rosenberg, 1989) . This 'tradeoff between external vs. internal flexibility has been particularly emphasised in discussions of Japanese employment relations, but it is also observed in Europe, especially in Germany (Sengenberger, 1992) .
Wage-setting institutions
It is a basic tenet of neoclassical economics that the more responsive wages are to 'market forces', the smaller the effect of unfavourable shifts in labour demand on employment. Wage-setting institutions that inhibit downward wage flexibility and/or reduce relative wage flexibility also reduce employment (growth) and increase unemployment. 1 The list of usual suspects includes unions, collective bargaining, statutory minimum wages, and wages councils. Before examining these factors, we summarise recent developments in levels and distributions of earnings. Table 9 reports trends in the earnings distributions of our five countries between 1973 and 1990. It shows that in all countries the earnings of men at the 90th percentdle gained relative to the median (although the gain was negligible in France). For women this holds only for the UK and the US. In Italy, and to a lesser extent in Germany and France, men and women at the 1 Oth percentdle also gained relative to the median, but in the US and UK they lost ground. The largest increase in earnings inequality between 1979 and 1990 occurred in the US (where the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile increased by 20% for men and 22% for women), followed by the UK (where it increased by 16% and 18% respectively). The starkest statistics in this table are the exceptionally low ratios of the 10th percentile to median earnings in the US and their deterioration between 1979 and 1990 for both men and women. Table 10 examines the changes in the real earnings of males at the 90th, 50th, and 10th percentiles that produced the changes in the earnings distributions reported in the preceding table. These data show widely differing rates of growth of real earnings. For the 1970s, France reported significant earnings growth, while the US saw much smaller increases. In the 1980s, earnings rose relatively strongly for most workers in Germany and the UK and somewhat less in France and Italy.
Trends in earnings.
2 In the US, median earnings fell for men, and earnings at the 10th percentile declined for both men and women. These data also show that the rise in earnings inequality in the UK (Table 9 ) was due primarily to rapid 'The OECD Jobs Studies (1994, Chan 5.1) provides evidence that OECD countries in which wage dispersion increased the most during the 1980s also experienced the fastest employment growth.
2 Italy is a unique case, with strong earnings gains for men at the top and the bottom, and negligible gains for the median. This suggests that mean earnings for men rose substantially, even though the median did not. earnings growth at the top, while the increase in inequality in the US resulted from a combination of a fall in earnings at the bottom and a rise of those at the top. We have documented broadly divergent earnings trends among this group of major industrialised countries. These national economies operate in the same world economy, facing similar patterns of demand and with access to similar technology, yet in Germany low-wage workers' earnings grew rapidly, while they increased slowly in France, Italy, and the UK, and even fell in the US. In some countries, the earnings distribution became radically more unequal (the UK and the US), while in others it changed little. We now turn to a discussion of the wage-setting institutions in these countries which have given rise to these divergent records.
Unionisation and collective bargaining coverage.
To the extent that unions raise workers' bargaining power vis a vis employers, they would be able to raise the average wage level. Collective bargaining also likely reduces short-run aggregate wage flexibility (since wages are contractually fixed) and relative wage flexibility (since collective bargaining introduces a kind of 'moral inertia' into the determination of pay scales and relative wages). We therefore expect that, over the long run (and given the rate of growth of labour productivity), countries where union strength and collective bargaining coverage have declined the most will have experienced the smallest wage gains (especially lower and middle level wages) and the biggest increases in earnings inequality. Tables 11 and 12 report trends among our countries in unionisation and collective bargaining coverage.
1 In the four European countries, the share of employees covered by collective bargaining is substantially higher than the share that belongs to unions. The reason is that in much of Europe collectively bargained wage settlements for an industry or sector are automatically extended to non-union workers in the sector. This happens where employers who are members of their sector's employers' association are obliged to follow the agreement reached between their association and the union (as in Germany and Italy), or where wage settlements are extended by statute to other firms that are not members of an employers' association (as in France).
Union density fell in the US throughout the period 1960-90. It either rose or held steady in all four European countries between 1960 and 1980 and then fell (fairly sharply everywhere except in Germany) between 1980 and 1990. In the US, where collective bargaining coverage does not extend significantly beyond union memberships, there was a parallel drop in coverage. In the UK, which saw 'a collapse in multi-employer bargaining in the late 1980s' (Milner, 1995, p. 87) , collective bargaining coverage fell by 33% while union density fell by 24% between 1980 and 1990. Milner concludes from his historical study of collective bargaining coverage in the UK, that 'coverage is lower now than at any point since the Second World War" and that 'the gap between collective bargaining coverage and union density has narrowed to an unprecedented degree'. In the three continental European countries, collective bargaining coverage appears to have held up in the 1980s, despite significant declines in union density in France and Italy. We also note that Germany's collective bargaining system is ranked by most observers as the most centralised and corporatist of the E-4 (see comparative rankings in Dell'Aringa and Lodovici, 1992). The US is, of course, at the opposite end of these rankings.
What effect did these developments have on earnings trends? In the US, which experienced a 30% drop in union density and a corresponding drop in collective bargaining coverage in the 1980s, median wages stagnated, lower-paid workers' wages fell, and the wage distribution became much more unequal (as seen in Tables 10 and 9) . Similarly, in the UK, where union density and collective bargaining coverage fell, the earnings distribution became sharply more unequal. However, despite the UK's weak productivity growth (Gordon, 1995, Table 3 ) and declining union strength in the 1980s, median earnings rose strongly, and even 10th percentile earnings increased.
1 In Germany, which experienced the least erosion of union density, earnings at all levels rose faster than in any other country, with especially strong gains at the bottom. 
Minimum wages.
The five countries in this study represent three different approaches to setting minimum wages (see Bazen and Benhayoun, 1992; Dolado, et al., 1996; OECD, 1994, Minimum wage protection suffered divergent fates in these countries. In France, the minimum wage remained fairly steady from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s at around 50% of average earnings, while in the US it fell from around 45% to 35% (OECD, 1994, Chart 5.14) . In Germany and Italy, the minimum wage for the vast majority of workers is the base wage set by the sectoral collective bargaining process which remained important through the 1980s. In the UK, the number and influence of the Wages Councils which 'probably never covered more than 15% of workers' (Bamber and Lansbury, 1993, p. 40) , declined throughout the 1980s. Workers under the age of 21 were removed from coverage in 1986, and in 1993, the last 26 Wages Councils were abolished.
Trends in the earnings distributions shown in Table 9 suggest that minimum wage provisions have an important influence on the degree of earnings inequality. In the three countries where minimum wage institutions survived the 1980s (France, Germany, and Italy), earnings at the 10th percentile actually rose relatively to those at the 50th percentile. In the two countries where minimum wage protection eroded (the UK and the US), they fell relative to the median.
Both union collective bargaining priorities and minimum wage legislation serve to prevent wages at the bottom of the wage distribution from falling (not just absolutely, but also relatively to the median wage). In countries where collective bargaining coverage 1 It is possible that the apparent rise of 10th percenrile earnings is a statistical artifact resulting from the especially high concentration of job loss among low-paid workers in the UK (see Schmitt, 1994, p. 188). Their departure shifts some workers who were formerly in the second earnings decile down into the bottom decile so that, even if these workers' earnings are actually falling, earnings observed at the 10th percentile can be higher in 1990 than they were in 1979. 2 We note in passing that this observation is inconsistent with either the corporatist or the Calmfors and Drifill hypothesis that the centralisation of bargaining promotes wage restraint.
3 In France, the statutory minimum can be improved by sectoral agreements which can be extended by the authorities. In the US, the states can (and do) set minima above the Federal standard.
has remained high and/or statutory, minimum wages have not been eroded, wages at the 10th percentile have risen along with wages at the median and 90th percentdle. Where collective bargaining coverage and/or minimum wage protections have been eroded, wages at the 10th percentile have fallen-either absolutely (in the US) or relatively (in the UK). And it is only in these two countries that unemployment has fallen over the last two time periods in our study (1980-87 and 1988-96) . These associations between wage trends at the bottom of the wage distribution, on the one hand, and unemployment trends, on the other, appear to suggest a trade-off between job growth and the growth of earnings of low-paid workers.
Unemployment insurance and income support
It is widely accepted that the unemployment rate is affected by the availability and generosity of unemployment benefits. Theory suggests that availability of unemployment benefits can raise the unemployment rate both directly (raising the reservation wage of the unemployed, thereby prolonging the job search and the average duration of a spell of unemployment) and indirectly (reducing the 'cost of job loss', thereby increasing labour's bargaining power, raising wages, and reducing employment). The practical policy issue is not whether unemployment insurance raises unemployment, but rather how large this effect is and how can it be minimised without undermining the safety net function of unemployment insurance.
1
There are two basic principles governing how unemployment compensation is determined:
2 (1) the insurance principle, in which eligibility depends on previous work experience and benefits are set in relation to previous earnings for a limited duration (Italy and the US being the purist examples); and (2) the social welfare principle, in which eligibility is means tested and the emphasis is on guaranteeing a minimum level of income for a longer duration (the UK since 1981). Some countries have developed schemes based on a combination of both principles, with generally more welfare-oriented unemployment assistance (UA) kicking in when unemployment insurance (UI) benefits are exhausted. (France and Germany are examples, except that in Germany UA benefits remain wagerelated, and there is a third-guaranteed minimum income-scheme for those who are not adequately covered by UI and UA.)
Three parameters determine the generosity and impact of these unemployment compensation schemes: the benefit level (usually measured as a percentage of previous earnings replaced), the duration of benefits (the length of time a person can receive benefits) and the coverage (the percentage of the unemployed who receive benefits). Coverage depends on eligibility requirements and on duration of benefits. Initial replacement rates and coverage for our five countries are reported in Table 13 . Replacement rates are relatively high (and stable) in France and Germany and relatively low in Italy. They have been fairly stable (at about one-third of previous earnings) in the US, and they have declined precipitously in the UK since the early 1970s. Coverage, on the other hand, in 1991 was relatively high in Germany and the UK, low in Italy, and intermediate in France and the US.
Benefit duration varies from six months (in Italy and the US) to potentially unlimited duraoon in the other countries (as workers who exhaust their unemployment insurance benefits segue into unemployment assistance and more general income support Nou: The index is a simple average of replacement rates for beneficiaries in three family circumstances (single, dependent spouse, working spouse) by two earnings levels (average and twothirds average earnings) by three durations (the first, second and third, and fourth and fifth years). This index appears to understate Germany's benefit levels for the reason noted in Table 13 .
Source: Bldndal and Pearson, 1995, Table 4. programmes). Benefit replacement rates and duration have been combined into a summary measure of overall benefit generosity by the OECD (see OECD, 1994, Ch. 8; Blondal and Pearson, 1995) . The index-shown in Table 14 -averages benefit replacement rates over a five-year period for workers in three different family circumstances and two earnings levels. By this measure, long-term income support for the unemployed (in 1991) is most generous in France and Germany, less generous (and decreasing) in the UK and the US, and negligible in Italy. Comparing this ranking with the ranking of these country's long-term unemployment rates (LTURs) in Table 6 (which shows Italy and the UK to have by far the highest LTURs both before and after our adjustment) fails to establish any correlation between the level and duration of income support programmes for the unemployed and the incidence of long-term unemployment. Blondal and Pearson (1995) make the important point that in many countries more working-age people without jobs receive non-employment benefits than receive unemployment benefits, particularly early retirement and invalidity (or disability) benefits. They argue that there is likely to be some degree of substitution between nonemployment benefits and unemployment benefits, since governments, employers, and job losers may all have reasons to prefer a transition to early retirement or disability rather than to unemployment. A rough indication of the level of non-employment benefits is provided in Table 15 . These benefits are at least as generous as unemployment benefits in most of our countries and more generous in Italy. These data probably go a long way towards accounting for the relatively high non-employment rates of 55-64-year-old males in France and Germany (Table 3 ) and the very low unemployment rate for older males in Italy (Table 2 ).
Conclusion
We have examined a number of institutional factors in order to determine whether labour market rigidities can be judged the main culprit for the overall increase in unemployment over the past 35 years and for the dramatic differences in unemployment rates among the five countries under review. We conclude that these institutional factors change in a pattern that is much too varied and erratic both within and among these countries to account for the general rise in unemployment. We believe that further research should pursue the suggestions of several analysts that the overall upward trend in unemployment rates is related to a global decline in the growth of aggregate demand throughout the advanced industrialised economies.
1 The effects of this slowdown, however, are mediated by the specific labour market institutions and policies of each country. Thus, for the E-4 they manifest themselves in relatively poor employment performance and for the US in relatively poor earnings and productivity performance (Buchele and Christiansen, 1995; Freeman, 1994) . We caution, however, that commonly cited differences in unemployment rates are exaggerated, and that it is not at all clear that US-style employment
